U.S. Army protection of travel on the Oregon Trail emerges in soldiers’ words as a mix of military presence, warnings, daily garrison labor, and violent conflict. In 1845, Brevet Capt. John C. Fremont argued that if communication with Oregon Territory was to remain open, military force was absolutely necessary and that the area around Fort Laramie was the most suitable place for a post on the Platte. That same year, Col. Stephen W. Kearney told Brule, Ogalala, and Arapaho near Fort Platte that he was opening a road for white emigrants and that they must not disturb those moving across the mountains. In June 1853, First Lieutenant Richard B. Garnett, after the Fort Laramie ferry incident involving Chief Little Brave’s Miniconjou Sioux and the fort’s garrison, said he regretted killing any of their people but would act the same way again, offering friendship if they behaved peacefully and warning of retribution otherwise. After the August 1854 Grattan fight, General William S. Harney told a peace council at Fort Pierre in March 1856 that the trouble had spread from one bad man who killed a cow and was not surrendered. Army service along the trail also meant routine work and harsh conditions: in June 1864 at Deer Creek Station, Private Hervey Johnson wrote of building, hauling wood, making hay, and sleeping outdoors in wagons; in June 1865 at Platte Bridge Station, First Sergeant Isaac B. Pennock recorded bitter wind, cold, and snow. Fighting remained deadly in 1865. Private Stephen H. Fairfield recalled the July 26 Platte Bridge battle as a desperate race for life in which men were overtaken and killed and escape seemed miraculous. On the same day, Commissary Sergeant Amos J. Custard insisted on pushing an army supply train into Platte Bridge despite warnings. Looking back in 1903, Fairfield said Native people had turned to arms as wagon trains, telegraph lines, and railroad surveys crossed their hunting grounds without consent, threatening their game, land, and way of life.