As Minty’s skirmishers withdrew, Judson Kilpatrick and Eli Murray realigned King’s 3rd and 5th Kentucky to face quiet Confederate infantry while, at the other end of the field, Fielder Jones’ brigade, Captain Beebe’s battery, and Lieutenant Bennett’s two guns fired on Ross’s cavalry. The lead horses for the command had been corralled behind King’s Kentuckians, and Captain Burns watched troopers from Minty’s 4th Regulars, 4th Michigan, and 7th Pennsylvania mount and form behind the hill defended by Fielder Jones’ brigade. About 2 p.m., Kilpatrick asked whether Burns’s men could charge through and break the enemy in front of them, and after Burns said they could and that the charge should be made with sabers, Kilpatrick told him to have Colonel Minty make the charge that way. When Minty arrived, he said he had decided to charge in columns of fours with the regiments of his brigade side by side, and Kilpatrick agreed. Lieutenant Sam Barron of the 3rd Texas recalled that no order was heard and no word was spoken as every officer and man grasped the situation at a glance, held the line for a few seconds, and emptied their weapons at the heads of the advancing columns, creating only a momentary flutter before they came on. On August 20, 1864, three compact columns of Union cavalry charged across the field at Nash Farm with drawn sabers, and dismounted Confederate cavalrymen were quickly cut down, swallowed up, and swept away. The fight at Nash Farm convinced Union General William T. Sherman that his cavalry could not or would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, so he reluctantly moved his entire army in a last-ditch effort to cut the two railroads supplying the Confederate army defending Atlanta. Sherman’s change in strategy, together with a two-day battle at Jonesboro, ultimately forced the city to surrender.